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I. INTRODUCTION
The Survey period began only two months after the Michigan Trust
Code took effect.' Thus, attorneys handling matters subject to the new
trust law were only beginning to delve into how their practices will
change.2 At the same time, estate planners who handle larger estates
spent the first part of the Survey period on edge about federal estate tax
uncertainty. 3 Although Congress in mid-December 2010 did act to
f Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. B.A./B.B.A.,
cum laude, Southern Methodist University; J.D., cum laude, Cornell Law School; LL.M.,
University of Houston Law Center.
1. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7101 (West 2010). The Michigan Trust Code
became effective on April 1, 2010.
2. See, e.g., Daniel Cogan, Navigating the Michigan Trust Code, 29 MICH. PROB. &
EST. PLAN. J. 41, 41 (2010), available at www.michbar.org/probate/pdfs/summerl0.pdf
("Perhaps there will not be quite the sense of rhythm experienced by a motorcyclist, but
after study and review the Michigan Trust Code will certainly reveal its logic and its
organization, and it will ultimately make our jobs easier.").
3. See, e.g., Mandy Chardoul, Estate Planning: Reacting to the New Law, 30 MICH.
PROB. & EST. PLAN. J. 2 (2011), availableat www.michbar.org/probate/pdfs/springl l.pdf
(describing the estate planning bar's reaction to "months of concern regarding looming
tax increases", and observing that "[n]ow that the law has passed, we can breathe a sigh
of relief.").
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extend the estate tax relief of the past decade, it did so only temporarily,4
leaving many questions for future planning.s With the new Michigan
Trust Code and the federal estate tax changes, practitioners came through
the Survey year with much on their plate to digest.6 It is perhaps
fortunate that few cases were decided in this field at either the Michigan
Court of Appeals or Michigan Supreme Court level, and those few did
not signal significant new directions in the law.
II.SELECTED MICHIGAN TRUSTS & ESTATES CASES 2010-2011
In the Survey period, the Michigan Court of Appeals decided four
cases that settle questions relating to decedents' estates. They are
discussed below in order of the decisions.
A. In re Leix Estate
1. Description
The Leix case 7 dealt with so-called "mutual wills" executed by each
of two married spouses and assets transferred by one spouse following
the first spouse's death.8 Viola Leix (Mrs. Leix) died in December 1983.9
4. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) [hereinafter "EGTRRA"], among other things, raised the
dollar level above which individual estates are subject to the federal estate tax, with the
level increasing over time and vanishing altogether in 2010. But EGTRRA's relief came
with a sunset date at the end of 2010, after which-unless Congress took action-the
federal estate tax would automatically revert to its pre-2001 level. In mid-December
2010, Congress passed the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and
Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010) (codified in
various sections of 26 U.S.C.), which avoided significant change by simply extending the
EGTRRA provisions another two years. See generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al.,
EstatePlanningafter the 2010 Tax ReliefAct: Big Changes,But Still No Certainty, 114 J.
TAX'N 68 (2011).
5. See, e.g., George W. Gregory, An Overview of Estate Planning and Estate
Administration Under the 2010 Tax Act: The "Clawback," Electing Out of the Federal
Estate Tax, Electing to Pay the Generation-SkippingTransfer Tax for 2010 Because the
Inclusion Ratio Is Zero, PortabilityIs Useful, but the Credit Shelter Trust Is Not Dead
Yet, 30 MICH. PROB. & EST. PLAN. J. 4 (2011) (discussing and proposing various
alternatives for estate and gift planning); Lorraine F. New, Path to Portability,30 MICH.
PROB. & EST. PLAN. J. 18, 19 (2011) ("After many years of subtle changes in estate tax
rules and planning we have hit a phase of volatility. It is time to be alert for pitfalls and
opportunities for our clients in an effort to help them distribute their assets as they desire
with the correct amount of tax paid.").
6. See Gregory, supra note 5; see also New, supra note 5.
7. In re Leix Estate, 289 Mich. App. 574, 797 N.W.2d 673 (2010).
8. Id. at 575.
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She and her husband, Carlton J. Leix (Mr. Leix), had owned various
assets together, including bank accounts and real estate.10 Little more
than a year before Mrs. Leix's death, the couple executed three
documents-"identical wills, a revocable-trust agreement, and an
agreement to execute mutual wills"-that worked together to establish a
trust for the lifetime benefit of their granddaughter, Melady," with the
couple's issue as the remainder beneficiaries receiving equal shares
following Melady's death. 12 During the years following Mrs. Leix's
death, her surviving husband took a number of steps to ensure that
Melady would receive all of his assets after his death.13 By the time of
Mr. Leix's death in 2008, "nearly all of the assets were titled jointly in
his and Melady's names or named Melady as beneficiary."' 4 As a result,
upon Mr. Leix's death, most of his assets passed outside probate directly
to Melady, bypassing the trust.15
Not surprisingly, as in many cases where immediate family members
are skipped over in a will, the couple's son, Carlton E. Leix (Carlton),
was not happy with his father's financial arrangements.1 6 By arranging
for assets to transfer outside probate, the father effectively deprived the
trust of assets that would otherwise have eventually passed to the
contingent beneficiaries, including the younger Carlton.' 7 Along with an
omitted grandchild, Carlton asked the probate court to rectify the
situation by imposing "a constructive trust on certain assets in" Melady's
control.' 8 The unhappy descendents claimed that Mr. Leix's transfers of
assets into Melady's name violated the 1982 mutual wills agreement.' 9
The probate court, which heard the initial suit, supported Melady.2 0
The court found the 1982 mutual wills agreement to be "valid and
binding," but nevertheless concluded "that nothing in the agreement put
9. Id. at 576.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id at 578.
13. For example, Mr. Leix took funds from bank accounts previously owned with
Viola and purchased annuities with Melady as beneficiary. Leix, 289 Mich. App. at 576.
He opened checking accounts with Melady as joint owner. Id. He also had real estate retitled with himself, Melady, and her mother as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Id.
14. Id
15. Id. at 578.
16. Id. at 577.
17. Id. at 576-77.
18. Id. at 576-78.
19. Leix, 289 Mich. App. at 577.
20. Id. at 576-78.
21. Id at 577.
22. Id.
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any restrictions on what the surviving party could do with the parties'
assets . ...

"

In the absence of any such restriction, according to the

court, Mr. Leix had the right to transfer assets during his lifetime without
running afoul of the mutual wills agreement from years past.22
On appeal, no one disputed the validity of Mr. and Mrs. Leix's
agreement to execute mutual wills. The court of appeals focused instead
on "whether an agreement to execute mutual wills limits a surviving
spouse's ability to dispose of the assets that the parties held jointly as he
or she chooses." 23 In other words, did the terms of the agreement
constrain Mr. Leix to preserve the assets so that they would be available
to fund the trust for Melady and, after her death, for the other
beneficiaries of the trust? From the court's perspective, two distinct
issues were involved: "(1) whether assets that are held jointly by the
contracting parties are subject to an agreement to make mutual wills[,]
and (2) to what extent does an agreement to make mutual wills restrict
the surviving spouse's ability to transfer assets." 24
The court dealt quickly with the first issue. Melady and her husband,
the respondents at the appellate level, sought a ruling that "in every
instance, an agreement to make mutual wills does not apply to property
that the contracting parties own jointly at the time the first testator dies . .
.25 The court rejected that broad proposal.26
Turning to the second issue, the court acknowledged that "Michigan
caselaw is not well developed." 27 The following pages of the opinion
then attempted to clarify Michigan law, albeit on the inherently limited
question of "whether an agreement to make mutual wills restricts the
surviving spouse's ability to dispose of assets absent express limitations
21. Id. at 577.
22. Id. at 577.
23. Leix, 289 Mich. App. at 578.
24. Id. at 579.
25. Id. at 580.
26. Id. at 582. Melady and her husband relied heavily on another Michigan Court of
Appeals case, In re VanConett Estate, 262 Mich. App. 660, 687 N.W.2d 167 (2004), in
which the couple's wills "revealed a clear expression of their intent to enter into a
contract to dispose of their property in the manner expressed in their wills . . . ." Leix, 289
Mich. App. at 579. In Leix, another Michigan Court of Appeals panel limited VanConett
to its very specific facts. Id at 582. One well-known Michigan trusts and estates
commentator, retired Calhoun County Probate Judge Phillip E. Harter, observed that it
would have been preferable for such limitation to come from the Michigan Supreme
Court but, in lieu of such clarification from the higher court, "we should probably follow
this opinion and consider In re VanConett Estate limited to its particular circumstances."
Phillip E. Harter, Recent Decisions in Michigan Probate, Trust, and Estate Planning
Law, 30 MICH. PROB. & EsT. PLAN. J. 8, 9 (2010), available at
www.michbar.org/probate/pdfs/winterlO.pdf.
27. Leix, 289 Mich. App. at 582.
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in the agreement . . . ."28 The court rejected the appellants' urged cases

on the ground that those cases all "involved agreements to convey
specific property,"29 which was not the case here. As with the position
pushed by Melady and her husband on the first point, the court here, in
effect, found the stance taken by the junior Carlton and his niece too
broad. The younger Carlton and his niece wanted the court to adopt, as
"[a) corollary of the rule that the surviving co-maker of an agreement to
make a mutual will is irrevocably bound by that agreement after the
death of the other co-maker," a holding "that the surviving co-maker
cannot transfer assets in a manner that would defeat the agreement., 3 0
The court declined the invitation.3'
Instead, the decision provided an overview of competing
jurisdictions' approaches to handling a decedent's assets when that
decedent had agreed to a mutual will. As the Leix court pointed out,
"[s]ome jurisdictions allow the surviving spouse ... to use the property
for support and ordinary expenditures, but not to give away considerable
portions of it or make gifts that defeat the purpose of the agreement." 2
Alternatively, the court pointed out that some jurisdictions allow
survivors to deal with property as they wish during their lifetimes,
without regard to any agreements as to mutual wills. 3 3 The court also
noted jurisdictions where courts actually invalidated transfers made by a
surviving spouse when those transfers negated or limited the effect of a
mutual will.34 In those cases, the courts generally held that allowing such
transfers violated an implied covenant of good faith.3 s
In the end, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted with
approval jurisdictions in which courts have "focused on enforcing the
terms of agreements to make wills as they are written."3 The court then
declined "to recognize implied limitations on the transfer of assets by the
surviving spouse in the case of an agreement to make mutual wills."37
Because the agreement to make mutual wills between the couple did not
contain express restrictions on Mr. Leix's use of the assets after his
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 590.
Id. at 584.
Leix, 289 Mich. App. at 584.
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 586-88.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 590.
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wife's death (or on Mrs. Leix should her husband have predeceased her),
the court refused to read such restrictions into the agreement and restrict
Mr. Leix's behavior.3 8 Instead, the court protected Mr. Leix's choices
even though they would result in little to no assets eventually available
for the trust's contingent beneficiaries. 39
2. Discussion
On the surface, the Leix case resolves a relatively narrow issue:
whether a valid agreement to enter into mutual wills restricts a surviving
spouse's use of assets following one spouse's death. The ruling in Leix
makes clear that a surviving spouse can do as he or she wishes as long as
the mutual will does not contain any specific restriction on use of
assets.4 o Should a mutual will include disposition of specific property,
however, other cases cited by the Leix court indicate that the mutual will
would be upheld as to that property. 4 1 Moreover, should an agreement to
enter into mutual wills contain express limitations on a surviving
spouse's general ability to treat property as his own following the first
spouse's death, the Leix decision suggests that such an express limitation
also would be upheld if the contract contained "clear and unambiguous"
language to that effect. 42
The Leix case provides a cautionary tale for practitioners. If clients
are going to enter into an agreement to make mutual wills, such an
agreement must be precise as to its application. If the parties intend for
the surviving spouse to have complete control over any assets jointly
owned, that should be so stated.4 3 Alternatively, if the parties intend to
allow the surviving spouse only some degree of control-but not
absolute freedom-with regard to those assets, the degree of control
should be meticulously delineated. Of course, the problem with such
specificity lies in the unpredictability of human nature. Although both
parties might be unable to envision a future period when either would
wish different choices, such a future may nonetheless develop. Lawyers
tend to incorporate flexible, broad provisions to accommodate

38. Id. at 591.
39. Leix, 289 Mich. App. at 591.
40. See id. at 590-91.
41. Id. at 579, 581 (citing Schondelmayer v. Schondelmayer, 320 Mich. 565, 31
N.W.2d 721 (1948); Getchell v. Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W. 156 (1939)).
42. Id. at 590 (quoting Burkhardt v. Bailey, 260 Mich. App. 636, 656-57, 680 N.W.2d
453 (2004)).
43. Admittedly, one might question why such a couple would enter into a mutual will
if they intend to give each other the power to defeat such will after the first dies.
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uncertainties. Unfortunately, the more flexible the language, the greater
the risk of litigation over any uncertainties.
Thus, an agreement to maintain the provisions of mutual wills is not
the best answer. A trust may offer a better and more flexible solution for
a client who desires to ensure the availability of assets for the surviving
spouse while maintaining protection for future generations.
B. In re Leete Estate
1. Description
The Leete case" involved a number of procedural questions in
addition to interpretation of Michigan's simultaneous death provisions 45
as they appear in the Michigan Estates and Protected Individuals Code
(EPIC).4 6 The property at issue was a cottage in Mackinaw City that had
been owned for the past century by the family of Frederick Leete, one of
the decedents, but with regard to which Mr. Leete (who had inherited the
property) had "executed a quitclaim deed" that transferred ownership to
himself and his wife "as tenants by the entirety."4A Mr. Leete and his
wife, Barbara, died in their home in Indiana as a result of carbon
monoxide poisoning. 8 Mrs. Leete was found dead on February 28, 2008;
Mr. Leete died "on March 3, 2008, at 9:10 p.m." 4 9 Mr. Leete died testate,
with a will dated in 1974; Mrs. Leete died intestate. 50 Both "had children
from prior marriages" but no children together, although they had been
married for thirty-four years at the time of their demise.
Mr. Leete's will, in relevant part, left his wife the property in
Mackinaw City "if she shall survive me for a period of more than thirty
(30) days" and otherwise to his children.5 2 Following the couple's deaths,
both Mr. Leete's son and Mrs. Leete's daughter claimed ownership rights
in the Mackinaw City property. The son argued, as the appellant, that the
property belonged entirely to his father's estate while the daughter
argued, as the appellee, that one-half of the property belonged to her
mother's estate. The son's argument in the trial court appeared to rest
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

In re Leete Estate, 290 Mich. App. 647, 803 N.W.2d 889 (2010).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2702 (West 2002).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.1101-8206 (West 2002).
Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id at 650.
Id at 651.
Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 651-52.
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on his unsupported allegation5 4 that Mr. Leete survived his wife by more
than 120 hours because she died on February 27, 2008.55 The daughter's
argument relied on the EPIC provisions governing simultaneous death.56
Specifically, the daughter pointed to the basic rule that, "if it is not
established by clear and convincing evidence that 1 of 2 co-owners with
right of survivorship survived the other co-owner by 120 hours, 1/2 of
the co-owned property passes as if I had survived by 120 hours and 1/2
as if the other had survived by 120 hours."5
After some wrangling, the parties agreed to an order issued May 19,
2009 by the trial court that gave Mr. Leete's son ninety days to produce
evidence that his father survived Mrs. Lette by at least 120 hours.58 The
order further provided for summary disposition in favor of Mrs. Leete's
daughter should the son fail to produce the requested evidence within the
specified time frame. 9 On August 20, 2009, once the ninety-day period
passed, the trial court granted summary disposition for the daughter,
citing "no clear and convincing evidence" that the senior Mr. Leete had
outlived his wife by the requisite 120 hours.o
On appeal, Mr. Leete's son focused on technical, procedural
arguments. First, he complained that the trial court's summary
disposition order in favor of Mrs. Leete's daughter was "void because it
did not meet the requirements" of the applicable Michigan court rule.6 1
Specifically, he claimed that the conditional quality of the initial order
violated the rule and "that the order was not in conformity with the
probate court's decision."62 The appellate court rejected all of the son's
points. Relying on the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the rule's
language, the court observed that nothing in Michigan Court Rule
54. The appellate court noted that the son "did not provide any evidence in support of
this allegation." Id. at 653.
55. Mrs. Leete's body was discovered by her daughter on February 28, 2008 at about
1:40 p.m. The death certificate listed her date of death as that same day with the time of
death left "unknown." Id. at 651. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he
longest length of time possible between Barbara's and Frederick's deaths would be 117
hours and 10 minutes," which "calculation assumes that Barbara died at the earliest time
possible on February 28th, i.e., immediately after the day began at midnight." Id. at 652
n.2.
56. Id. at 664-65. The 120-hour rule is part of EPIC's simultaneous death rule. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2702.
57. Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 652 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.2702(3)).
58. Id. at 654.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 654.
61. Id. The court rule was MICH. CT. R. 2.602(B).
62. Id. 659.
63. Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 659.
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2.602(B) expressly prohibits a conditional order of the type entered
here. 4 As for the argument that the order did not "comport[] with the
court's decision" as the rule requires, 65 the appellate court observed that,
"because a court speaks through its written orders, the court's signature
on the May 19 order implies that the substance of the order was in
conformity with its decision to follow appellee's suggested course of
action."66 Then, because the August 20 order granting summary
judgment complied with the provisions of the May 19 order, the
appellate court "conclude[d] that the August 20 order was validly entered
under the same subrule."
The appellate court seemed annoyed by Mr. Leete's son. Not only
did it call part of his argument "illogical," 6 8 but the court also
condemned the son's desired position as one that "would allow litigants
to haphazardly agree to the entry of orders that envision the entry of
additional orders and later escape the effect of those subsequently
entered orders on appeal by declaring the later orders void." 69 Creating
such a situation, according to the court, would be "a waste of judicial
resources ... .
The son also quibbled with the summary disposition the trial court
granted to Mrs. Leete's daughter, and the appellate court spent more than
half of the opinion dispensing with the son's arguments on this issue.
First, the son argued that the trial court should have made a ruling as to
whether Indiana law applied and its effect.72 Because Mr. and Mrs. Leete
maintained a residence in Indiana and, in fact, died in Indiana, the son
wanted Indiana law to apply.7 3 However, the younger Mr. Leete also
filed an affidavit of domicile with the trial court that listed his father's
domicile as the Mackinaw City address. 74 Moreover, the court noted, by
its terms, EPIC applies to a "nonresident's property that is located in this
state." 75 The court concluded that "application of EPIC, as opposed to

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 657.
Id. at 656 (quoting MICH. CT. R. 2.602(B)(2)) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id. at 658.
Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 659.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 659-71.
Id. at 660.
Id at 661-62.
Id. at 662.
Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 662 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 700.1301(b)).
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Indiana law, was appropriate," whether Mr. Leete was deemed a
Michigan or Indiana resident.
Second, the son claimed that, because his father's will and the quit
claim deed both preceded enactment of EPIC, EPIC did not apply to the
situation." Here, too, the appellate court bluntly disagreed, stating that
"EPIC applies to a governing instrument executed before EPIC came into
effect, as long as it does not affect an accrued right and as long as the
governing instrument does not contain a contrary intent."78 Neither the
will nor the deed contained any language suggesting "that EPIC should
not apply."79 In addition, the court cited precedent to the effect that an
"accrued right" for purposes of EPIC does not include an expectancy
under a will, which can be changed until the point of a testator's death.so
Third, if EPIC did apply, the son wanted the court to reject the
simultaneous death provisions of EPIC as applied to the situation.8 ' The
appellate court provided background on the evolution of the
simultaneous death provisions, explaining that prior to EPIC, "the 120hour survival requirement did not always apply to nonprobate transfers,
such as joint estates with rights of survivorship[,]" as in this case. 82 Mr.
Leete's son focused on two perceived problems with the 120-hour
requirement. First, he returned to the same argument he offered against
application of EPIC in the first place-namely, that the "governing
instrument" evidenced a "contrary intent."8 3 The appellate court,
however, pointed again to the absence in the will and the deed of any
language suggesting that current law (i.e., EPIC) should not apply.
Without that, the contrary intent argument failed completely.84
Having found that EPIC's simultaneous death provisions applied and
observing that Mr. Leete's son did not dispute the meaning of the
provisions or provide any evidence whatsoever indicating that his father
had outlived Mrs. Leete, the court also dismissed the one exception the
son urged.85 EPIC provides an exception to the simultaneous death rule
76. Id. at 663.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich. App. 122, 127-28, 748 N.W.2d
265 (2008)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 663-64 (citing In re Estate of Smith, 252 Mich. App. 120, 127-28, 651
N.W.2d 153 (2002)) ("[A]n 'accrued right' ... mean[s] something other than a right
under a will upon the testator's death. . .
81. Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 665.
82. Id. at 665 (citing VanConett, 262 Mich. App. at 667-68).
83. Id. at 666 (referencing MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2701 (West 2002)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 669.
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where "application of a 120-hour requirement of survival to multiple
governing instruments would result in an unintended failure or
duplication of a disposition." 86 Although the court admitted that
"multiple governing instruments" existed thanks to the presence of both
the will and the deed, it rejected the son's position that application of the
120-hour rule would cause "an unintended failure . .. of a disposition.""
From the court's perspective, the fact that Mr. Leete executed a quitclaim
deed subsequent to execution of his will reflected a change in Mr.
Leete's intentions with regard to the Mackinaw City property.8 8 In effect,
by executing the quitclaim deed, Mr. Leete revoked the part of his will
relating to that piece of property. Thus, application of the 120-hour rule
to preserve one-half of the property for Mrs. Leete's estate carried out
Mr. Leete's intentions. To have allowed Mr. Leete's will to control
disposition would have frustrated his intent, according to the court. 9 The
court also considered an argument from the son as to whether the trial
court applied the wrong standard of review, but immediately rejected the
issue.9 0
2. Discussion
In all, the appellate court agreed on every point with the trial court,
and the son lost every issue. The result was hardly surprising. As the
appellate court noted, simultaneous death statutes have a long history.
They accomplish a socially desirable goal of adjusting distributions on
death "to ensure that a decedent's property passes to a beneficiary who
can personally benefit, as opposed to a beneficiary who became deceased
a short time later." 91 The son's arguments that EPIC should not applyeither based on a choice of law determination or because EPIC became
law after execution of both governing documents in this case-similarly
were doomed. The express language of EPIC answered the questions

easily. 9 2
Viewed from a distance, this case reflects the frustration of an adult
child striving to retain property viewed as a family heirloom for one side
of a family. The problem is a common one with second marriages and
children from previous unions. The case highlights the importance of
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2702(4)(d).
87. Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 669.

86.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id at 669.
Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 661-63.
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revisiting estate plans throughout the years as families change. Mr. Leete
executed his will in 1974,93 presumably around the time of his marriage
to his second wife. He executed the quitclaim deed that transformed
ownership of the cottage in 1996," but never revised his will. If not for
that will and its contradiction in terms with the reality of the deed's
ownership change, this case could have been avoided. The fact that Mr.
Leete made his wife a co-owner of the cottage almost fifteen years before
they died indeed suggests that his intentions toward that cottage had
changed over time. The conflict with his son might have been
unavoidable, but the time spent in the Michigan courts was unnecessary.
The irritated tone of the appellate court hints at this sentiment. Had Mr.
Leete's will been updated appropriately, as surely should have occurred
at some point in the thirty-four years of their marriage, the update could
have reflected the changes in the cottage ownership. While the son's
emotions might still have resulted in conflict, his legal options would
have been limited.
C. In re Nale Estate
1. Description
The Nale case 9 5 involves Michigan's slayer statute, the provision of
EPIC that causes an individual who "feloniously and intentionally" kills
a decedent to "forfeit[] all benefits . . . with respect to the decedent's

estate." 9 6 The decedent's wife in this case was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter in the stabbing death of her husband. 97 The probate court
applied the EPIC slayer statute rule and barred the wife from receiving
anything from her husband's estate.98 She appealed. 99 The wife argued
that voluntary manslaughter did not constitute a felonious and intentional
killing within the meaning of the slayer statute. 00 In particular, she
claimed that the killing was not intentional in the way first or second
degree murder is.' 0 ' She pointed to the fact that she had been acquitted of
murder as support for her position. 0 2
93. Leete, 290 Mich. App. at 651.
94. Id. at 650.
95. In re Nale Estate, 290 Mich. App. 704, 803 N.W.2d 907 (2010).
96. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2803(1) (West 2002).
97. Nale, 290 Mich. App. at 705.
98. Id. at 706.
99. Id. at 706.
100. Id. at 708.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 708.
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The appellate court disagreed with the wife and affirmed the probate
court's application of the slayer statute. 0 3 Noting that the courts in
Michigan look to common law for the elements of voluntary as opposed
the court cited precedent that
to involuntary manslaughter,'
characterized voluntary manslaughter as "intentional killing," 0 5 as
compared to involuntary manslaughter, which is characterized as "the
killing of another without malice and unintentionally." 06 The appellate
court also noted that, even before EPIC's codification of the slayer rule,
the Michigan Supreme Court had "referred favorably" to a treatise
explanation of the common law approach.107 The appellate court further
observed that the legislature is "presumed to know the existence of the
common law" when it takes action, yet the Michigan legislature made no
effort to limit the common law when it included the slayer rule in
EPIC. os

2. Discussion
Given the widespread application and acceptance of slayer statutes
across the United States and the clear wording of the Michigan version,
the result in Nale is predictable.109 From a policy perspective, it is also a
desirable result given the strong public policy incentive of preventing
those who intentionally kill another from profiting from their violent
action.no Nonetheless, the Nale case provides the valuable clarification

103. Nale, 290 Mich. App. at 710.
104. Id. (citing People v. Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 388, 471 N.W. 2d 346 (1991)).
105. Id. (citing People v. Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 534-35, 664 N.W. 2d 685 (2003)).
106. Id. at 709 (citing People v. Scott, 29 Mich. App. 549, 551, 185 N.W.2d 576
(1971)).
107. Among other points, the cited treatise discussion highlighted that "no distinction
can be made between a death caused by murder and one caused by manslaughter." Id.
(citing the Michigan Supreme Court's favorable reference to WHARTON ON HOMICIDE (3d
ed.) in Garwols v. Bankers' Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 428, 232 N.W. 239 (1930), and
Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 270-71, 63 N.W.2d 841 (1954)).
108. Nale, 290 Mich. App. at 710 (citing Wold Architects & Engineers v. Strat, 474
Mich. 223, 234, 713 N.W.2d 750 (2006)).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 8.4 (2003) (noting that forty-seven
states have adopted a slayer statute).
110. See, e.g., John W. Wade, Acquisition of Property by Willfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715, 715 (1936) ("That a man who murders another
and then seeks to take property as a result of his death is attempting to take advantage of
his own wrong is clear. That to allow such a result is repugnant to all sense of justice is
equally obvious."). See also Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y.1889) ("No one
shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to
found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.").
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that Michigan's statute applies equally to murder and to voluntary
manslaughter."'
D. In re Lundy Estate
1. Description
The Lundy case" 2 dealt with the rights of a bank as a secured
creditor to exercise its rights to pledged property upon default. The estate
sought to have the property at issue distributed to the family in
accordance with "the priority claims and allowances" established under
EPIC.'"' The bank had accepted assignment by the decedent (David Gary
Lundy) of a security interest in a Certificate of Deposit (CD) account as
collateral for a promissory note.114 Mr. Lundy personally guaranteed the
note and a mortgage between the bank and Lundy's Lane, L.L.C., his
family-owned party store." 5 In relevant part, the assignment agreement
provided that in the event of a default (which was defined to include Mr.
Lundy's death),"'6 the bank could "take all funds in the CD account and
. . . apply the funds to the indebtedness." 17 Mr. Lundy died in late
February 2008' 18 and the bank exercised its rights to the CD account at
the end of April 2008.119 Shortly afterward, in mid-May, the estate
claimed the assets in the CD account for various allowances for family

under EPIC.120
In early January 2009, Mr. Lundy's estate filed a claim for return of
the CD funds on the ground that, under EPIC, "the bank's security
interest in the CD account was of lower priority than the surviving
spouse's claim for reimbursement of reasonable funeral expenses, the

I11. Nale, 290 Mich. App. at 710.
112. In re Lundy Estate, 291 Mich. App. 347, 804 N.W.2d 773 (2011).
113. Id. at 347. When an estate does not have sufficient assets to pay all claims, EPIC
provides a list of priorities, starting with "[c]osts and expenses of administration" and
continuing with "[r]easonable funeral and burial expenses," followed by the
"[h]omestead allowance," the "[flamily allowance," and "[e]xempt property." MICH.
COmp. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.3805(l)(a)-(e) (West 2002).
114. Lundy, 291 Mich. App. at 349.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 350 n.4.
117. Id. at 350.
118. Id.
119. Lundy, 291 Mich. App. at 350.
120. Id. at 350-51.
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homestead allowance, the family allowance, and exempt property." 2 1
The bank, however, claimed that it had perfected its security interest in
the CD account and thus acquired "an interest superior to any and all
claims to the same collateral."1 22
Although the trial court agreed that the bank had a perfected security
interest, the court also believed that the bank's right to take funds in the
CD account and apply them to reduce the related indebtedness should
have been exercised during Mr. Lundy's lifetime or, at the latest, before
the filing for probate and appointment of a personal representative for the
estate.123 Once a personal representative was appointed, from the trial
court's perspective, EPIC took precedence over the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) provisions that govern secured interests. 124 As a result, the
trial court ruled the spouse's claims for homestead and family allowance
trumped the bank's claims.125
The appellate court considered both Article 9 of Michigan's version
of the UCCl 26 and EPIC. Looking first at the UCC and the assignment
agreement, the court concluded that the "[b]ank was entitled ... to apply
the balance of the CD account to the obligation secured by the account
(the mortgage) because the bank held the deposit account."l 2 7 Turning
then to EPIC, the court described how secured creditors-such as the
bank in this case-are distinguished from other creditors of an estate.128
For example, under certain circumstances a secured creditor may proceed
to enforce its security against the decedent's estate before appointment of
a personal representative, whereas other creditors must wait.129 In
discussing another exception for secured creditors in EPIC, the appellate
court emphasized part of the Reporter's Supplemental Comment: "The
secured creditor . . ha a priority position only as to the asset in which
the security is held. If the security is inadequate, the creditor has no
preference when trying to collect any deficiency." 130

121. Id. at 351. EPIC places "debts and taxes with priority under other laws of this
state" several steps below the various types of allowances for family. MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.3805(c), (d), (e) and (h).
122. Lundy, 291 Mich. App. at 351.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 351-52.
126. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 440.9101-9994 (West 2003).
127. Lundy, 291 Mich. App. at 354.
128. Id. at 354-59.
129. Id. (citing MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.3104 (West 2002)).
130. Id. at 355 (emphasis omitted) (citing EPIC Reporter's Supplemental Comment for
2005 to MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3801 (West 2002)).
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The estate argued, however, that the bank had "no priority position"
except as against an unsecured creditor. 13 1 In making this argument, the
estate relied on EPIC's hierarchy of priorities in paying out assets of an
estate in cases where the estate could not meet all claims.' 32 Under that
list, "[d]ebts and taxes with priority under other laws of this state" fall
well below the priority of the homestead allowance, family allowance
and exempt property, among other claims.133
The court, however, drew a distinction between the creditor's right to
exhaust the security in payment of the debt and the same creditor's right
to bring a claim against the estate. According to the court, "[n]o
provision requires a secured creditor that is otherwise entitled to exhaust
a security to first bring a claim against the estate in order to be permitted
to exhaust the security."l 34 A secured creditor may surrender the security
interest and file a claim as a general creditor against the estate, but would
then lose the priority position afforded by the security interest.
Alternatively, and more likely, a secured creditor could apply the assets
subject to the security interest against the debt and then file a claim for
any remaining amount of indebtedness, but with regard to such
remaining debt the secured creditor is again only a general creditor.13 6
The appellate court highlighted other EPIC provisions that similarly
distinguish a secured creditor from other general creditors.' 37 In each
case, the court noted that the various provisions "treat a secured creditor
differently and contemplate a secured creditor's right to collect from the
security without bringing a claim against the estate for estate funds.""'
The court also looked to Minnesota and Arizona, both states with probate
codes modeled-as is Michigan's-on the Uniform Probate Code, and
cited cases with similar facts where the courts ruled a secured creditor
could exhaust its security interest before filing a claim with the estate.139
The Michigan court then concluded that "the bank was entitled to

131. Id. at 356.
132. Id.
133. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3805(1) (West 2002).
134. Lundy, 291 Mich. App. at 357.
135. Id. at 357-58 (citing EPIC Reporter's Supplemental Comment for 2005 to MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3809 (West 2002)).
136. Id. at 358.
137. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3812 (West 2002) (prohibiting certain
actions against estate property, but noting that "[t]his section shall not be construed to
prevent the enforcement of a mortgage, pledge, or lien upon property in an appropriate
proceeding.").
138. Lundy, 291 Mich. App. at 358-59.
139. Id. at 359-60 (citing In re Estate of Larson, 359 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) and In re Estate of Stephenson, 173 P.3d 448 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007)).
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exhaust the funds in the CD account" and reversed the trial court ruling
in Lundy.140
2. Discussion
The obvious conflict in the case arises from two parallel parts of
Michigan law: Article 9 of the UCC and the priority list for claims under
EPIC. Perhaps naturally, given their areas of expertise, the estate looked
solely at EPIC and failed to delineate between types of creditors, whereas
the bank focused on the rights of secured creditors as governed by the
UCC. As a matter of statutory construction, the appellate court sided
with the bank. And, indeed, the parts of EPIC that the estate apparently
overlooked strengthened the bank's position. Article 9 of the UCC
protects secured creditors' rights, 14 1 and the decision in this case reflects
that, for better or worse.
On the other hand, the list of priority for payment of claims places
certain claims far ahead of general debts, specifically including
allowances for the surviving spouse and family.14 2 By not distinguishing
between general and secured creditors in the list of priorities, the
legislature left open the path the estate followed here. This court appears
to have perceived the legislature's omission almost as an oversight
handled by reference to the distinctions elsewhere in the statute, and
decisions from other jurisdictions support that analysis. But one could
see the alternative: that the legislature chose to classify secured creditors
with other creditors when the estate was otherwise insufficient to pay all
claims. The conflict lies in determining who most deserves estate assets.
Is society better served by elevating secured creditors over family
members in an insufficient estate? After all, after funeral expenses and
administrator's fees, the homestead allowance and family allowance do
not total to large sums.143 Would it perhaps be preferable to let creditors
slip below those minimal amounts in order to assist grieving and possibly
near-destitute surviving family members? Whatever the policy
140. Id. at 361.
141. See, e.g., Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G. Hillinger, 2001: A Code
Odyssey (New Dawnfor the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 Com. L.J. 105, 110 (2001)
(observing that "when Cousin Vinny masters Revised Article 9, the world is going to be
the secured creditor's oyster-inside and outside bankruptcy").
142. MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 700.3805.
143. The 2011 homestead allowance was $20,000. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.2402 (West 2002). The 2011 family allowance was $24,000. MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 700.2403 (West 2002). The exempt property allowance for 2011 was $14,000.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2404 (West 2002). The amounts are adjusted for years
after 2000 in accordance with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.1210 (West 2002).
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considerations, the case at least provides clarity, resolving the question
firmly in favor of creditors, at least for the time being.
III. CONCLUSION
The four cases discussed above do not move the law in Michigan in
any significant direction. With the exception of the Leete decision, they
each resolve specific questions in Michigan probate law. Of the four,
Lundy may prove the case with the greatest impact because of the current
economic climate. Given the number of struggling businesses, one can
easily imagine that more and more decedents may leave secured claims
against personal assets used to prop up business interests. If this happens,
families may be stunned to learn that, notwithstanding the apparent
protections in EPIC, secured creditors come first. Of course, given the
appeal of protecting families, Lundy may also prove the case with the
greatest chance of legislative intervention in the future.
Nale, on the other hand, seems the most straightforward of the cases.
Certainly, no one wants killers to profit from their wrongdoing. By
clarifying that voluntary manslaughter triggers application of the slayer
statute, the Michigan Court of Appeals furthers this basic societal goal.
The simultaneous death case, Leete, is also straightforward but adds
little if anything to the law. It works best as a caution to future potential
litigants to consider carefully before entering into a conditional
agreement and then suing in an effort to overturn its effect. The
annoyance seeping through the opinion should serve as a warning.
The mutual will agreement case, Leix, similarly delivers a lesson,
both to practitioners and individuals. The case illustrates why agreements
to make mutual wills are ill-advised. Not only do they breed litigation,
but they often fail to accomplish their goal, as happened here. While the
Leix case provides a path for future drafters who seek to create
enforceable mutual will agreements, the takeaway message should be to
avoid this road in the first place and seek alternative vehicles to carry out
client wishes.

144. Estate administrators may wish to provide formal notice to secured creditors in
order to take advantage of shorter statutes of limitations provided under EPIC. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3801(2), and Harter, supranote 26, at 11.

